


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This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. The views presented are the best judgments of individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to alternative interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Possible Collision Points for US-LDC Relations

This article represents a first examination of possible conflicts among US policies on global issues--such as LDC economic growth, US access to raw materials, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and conventional arms transfers--in seven key LDCs. It serves as an amplification of an earlier overview of evolving US-LDC relations. Designed to be thought provoking, it is intended to raise questions which will require continuing study by the intelligence community.*

US Policies

Under ideal conditions none of the current list of major multilateral US foreign policies necessarily collides with any other policy; each could be pursued on its own merits to a final conclusion without interfering substantially with the pursuit of any other policy. A list of these policies would include:

- Encouraging the economic advance of key LDCs, bringing them into the global economic system as rapidly as possible, but permitting only evolutionary and moderate change in the system itself.
- Assuring US access at stable prices to critical raw materials and to expanding LDC markets for US goods.
- Preventing the spread of a nuclear weapons capability by, among other means, curtailing the sale of sensitive nuclear technology.

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- Advancing the cause of human rights by moral suasion, diplomatic pressure, and, on occasion, the use of political and economic sanctions and incentives.
- Reducing the transfer of conventional arms abroad by all industrialized nations.

Ideal conditions rarely exist, however. In many (if not most) instances, when applied to relations with individual countries, conflicts will occur between pursuit of some multilateral initiatives and important bilateral policy concerns. Collisions will also frequently occur between successful realization at the same time of two or more US global policies in a specific bilateral context. This does not mean that gains cannot be achieved on a variety of fronts. It does indicate, however, that careful analysis of how the individual LDCs see the trade-offs among US initiatives and of their tactics for maximizing their freedom of action toward the US will be required. Some country examples follow:

Brazil

A number of US foreign policy initiatives collide in Brazil because they conflict with Brazilian national values and because the Brazilian Government suspects US motives for pursuing these policies. Brazil's leaders believe that their country is destined to become a major world power, possibly by the end of this century. This leads them to reject out of hand foreign pressures to adopt policies that they believe place obstacles in the way of achieving Brazil's destiny.

One of the hallmarks of moving toward major power status is, in their minds, the acquisition of the capacity for technological innovation, especially in the field of nuclear energy. As a consequence, Brazil will strongly resist any restrictions on its right to acquire sensitive nuclear technology. US efforts to prevent consummation of the Brazil-FRG nuclear agreement, which includes sale of this technology, is interpreted by the Brazilians as a deliberate attempt by the US to prevent them from acquiring major power status

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and as a serious infringement of their sovereignty. US human rights initiatives are seen in a similar light.

In the Brazilian case, US nuclear proliferation and human rights policies are having their major adverse impact on the general state of bilateral relations. If, however, the US also attempts to introduce the use of political and economic sanctions (especially in international institutions) to enforce these policies, there is a strong likelihood that conflicts would also develop with other major US multilateral goals. In particular, the steady economic advance of Brazil could be set back, since its economy is so sensitive to fluctuations in foreign investor confidence and in its credit standing. Moreover, Brazil would be likely to redouble its efforts to seek radical change in the decisionmaking structure of the international institutions being used against it.

Indonesia

US readiness to halt arms supplies to Indonesia because of human rights considerations has reinforced Jakarta's conclusion that it cannot depend on the US and must procure arms elsewhere. By restricting arms transfers to Indonesia, the US has reduced its ability to influence that country's arms procurement decisions over the longer term. Moreover, withholding US arms as an expression of disapproval of specific human rights - related practices is likely to work in opposition to US policy goals in the area of conventional arms transfer by heightening Indonesia's security concerns and driving it to seek arms from less restrictive suppliers.*

South Korea

In the case of South Korea, US objectives in human rights and in nuclear proliferation and arms transfer restraints are adversely affecting each other and bilateral relations. These policies clash because they

**See the article in this issue on "Human Rights and Indonesian-US Relations," pp. 27-35.*

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are perceived by the South Koreans to threaten their security against North Korea. South Korean perceptions of US readiness to halt arms assistance because of human rights violations, coupled with US intentions to withdraw its troops, make South Korea fear that the US commitment to South Korea's security is no longer reliable. South Korea has emphasized the need for a strong, self-sufficient defense force capability which, in its eyes, includes acquisition of nuclear technology which can be used to develop weapons and of conventional arms from other nations. US opposition to both of these aims causes further uneasiness over the American commitment to defend South Korea. It will probably create increased obstacles in efforts to reduce the US level of involvement there and may act as an additional stimulus for South Korea to obtain a higher level of conventional arms from non-US sources.

Philippines

The relationship to bilateral issues of the US policies on human rights and arms transfer limitations is extremely complex in the Philippines. At the moment, the US has some leverage over Manila on human rights matters because we have indicated a willingness not to reduce arms transfers if the Philippine Government ends certain human rights abuses.

Greatly complicating the situation is the fact that a new base rights agreement is under negotiation. One demand Manila is making for signing a new agreement is additional arms. Even if the US accedes to this demand, however, a new agreement would not necessarily result. Among other reasons for hesitating to sign a new agreement is President Marcos' apparent fear that as part of the approval process the US Congress would scrutinize too closely the human rights practices of his government. Such scrutiny might jeopardize current arms aid. He probably believes this kind of public review would also provide an issue which domestic and exiled political critics could use against him. It might also result in new pressures on human rights matters by the US Government to which he would be extremely reluctant to respond for political reasons.

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From the US viewpoint the problem is that we retain effective influence on the human rights issue only if we do not cut back on arms. Moreover, if we do reduce the flow of arms, we may adversely affect our bilateral and regional security interests in retaining access to military bases in the Philippines.*

Pakistan

Pakistan's two primary security-related foreign policy objectives are acquiring military aid to offset India's conventional arms superiority and obtaining nuclear technology which could eventually produce weapons to offset India's nuclear dominance. Success in attaining either one of these objectives would reduce the pressure to attain the other, but US global policy initiatives to reduce conventional arms transfers and to restrict the diffusion of sensitive nuclear technology tend to frustrate both objectives simultaneously. Within the limits established by the necessity to maintain the support of friendly oil-exporting Muslim countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, the Pakistanis are likely to express this frustration by joining the more militant LDCs in rejecting US positions on the gamut of North-South issues, as well as other areas of US interest, including human rights.

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Another area in which the harmonization of various US policy interests faces special problems is that of relations with the major OPEC oil-producing countries. Energy supply insecurities and economic and financial difficulties stemming from high oil prices have created pressures that complicate the pursuit of several multilateral policy objectives, such as restraint in conventional arms transfers.

Arms sales have escalated rapidly in the past few years as they have become a favored means of recycling oil money and seeking political influence and good will with oil producers. Saudi Arabia, the largest producer

**See the article in this issue on "Philippine-US Relations and the North-South Dialogue," pp. 7-12.*

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and the key to OPEC price moderation, and Iran, the largest non-Arab producer, have been the main recipients, and the US the main supplier.

Iran and Saudi Arabia, like Brazil, seek enhanced international recognition and status and place great importance on their bilateral relations with the US. The US in turn is under pressure, because of the oil leverage of these two countries, to be generally responsive to their security and economic development needs. While this of course does not entirely restrict US freedom of action in the region, it does constitute a constraint on a vigorous pursuit of arms restraint and human rights protection.

Other multilateral goals that may be complicated by dependence on Middle East oil include restrictions on the export of sensitive nuclear technologies and the suppression of terrorism. Progress on these issues, as on the restraint of arms transfers, is made even more difficult because it requires the cooperation of other OECD countries whose energy vulnerabilities are considerably greater than those of the US. In Europe and Japan, the maintenance of close relations with oil producers and the promotion of exports to these countries are immediate political and economic necessities that take precedence over the pursuit of more general and abstract world order goals.

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Philippine-US Relations and the North-South Dialogue

The increasingly tenuous nature of the Philippine-US "special relationship" both reflects and impels Manila's display of greater independence from US influence and its search for alternative sources of international support, at the same time as it attempts to retain its highly beneficial links with the US. Into this delicate foreign policy situation Washington has introduced a series of global diplomatic initiatives that further complicate Manila's international posture. This paper examines the possible impact of US policies promoting human rights and limiting arms transfers on the Philippines' stance in the North-South dialogue and on forthcoming base negotiations.

Philippine Foreign Policy Context

Since the Philippines gained independence in 1946, its international relations have been shaped by a "special relationship" with the US that is based on a sense of common history, shared security goals, and strong economic and emotional ties. This relationship is reflected in the Philippines by the predominance of US trade, investment, a mutual defense treaty, sizable US economic and military assistance, and a large US military presence. These factors have perpetuated a post-colonial sense of dependence on the US that, until recently, discouraged development of substantial ties with other nations or serious involvement in multilateral diplomacy. The longstanding patron-client relationship tends to complicate relations between the two countries by creating mutually unrealistic expectations of harmony and exaggerated concern about signs of discord. On the other hand, close economic and political ties have engendered a resentment of American influence that has led Philippine leaders to react with elaborate, if usually rhetorical, demonstrations of national independence to prove that they have not compromised Philippine sovereignty.

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Changing US foreign policy, perceived shifts in the balance of power in Asia, and increasingly assertive nationalist sentiment at home have forced Manila to consider more practical means of muting its traditional foreign policy dependence on the US. The Arab oil boycott, which seriously affected Philippine energy supplies, exposed a Philippine economic vulnerability that the US could not alleviate. The American withdrawal from South Vietnam raised questions about the credibility of US guarantees in general, and the subsequent Communist victories in Indochina led to the fear that the Philippines might suffer because of its close alignment with the US. Furthermore, the US had refused to assist in combating the externally backed Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines, thereby demonstrating, in Manila's view, the limitations of the mutual defense treaty.

To offset these perceived liabilities, President Ferdinand Marcos has attempted to gain credibility for the Philippines as a nonaligned nation--without, however, sacrificing its beneficial ties with the US. His new foreign policy balances pragmatic relations with the US, on the one hand, against more fervent posturing on independence as well as development of closer ties with ASEAN, other LDCs, and the Communist states on the other. Manila has found multilateral forums particularly useful as platforms for rhetorical demonstrations of political distance from the US.

The eclectic nature and wide range of political views represented in the G-77 (the LDC caucus) have offered Manila scope for pursuing its new foreign policy balancing act. Philippine advancement of LDC positions has gained it a leadership role in this group. By affirming solidarity with other LDCs, including the OPEC nations, Manila has endeavored both to protect itself against the damaging effects of another oil boycott and to undercut international Islamic support for the domestic Muslim rebellion. In addition, the Philippines apparently hopes eventually to benefit from the realization of such G-77 goals as commodity price stabilization, wider access to industrial markets, and codes governing technology transfer.

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The US Bases in the Philippines

The US base presence has historically blocked Third World acceptance of the Philippines as a truly nonaligned country and has also been a focal point for nationalistic Philippine resentment. To counter both of these problems, Marcos moved in 1975 to reduce the appearance of dependency by demanding renegotiation of the base agreement.*

The Marcos government would in fact be reluctant to lose the bases. They provide significant amounts of foreign exchange to the Philippine economy, employ tens of thousands of Filipinos, and are concrete evidence of the security relationship with the US.

Marcos may have intended to provoke US concern about his commitment to the security relationship in order to extract increased aid and encourage sensitivity to Philippine policy concerns. Confident of the value of the facilities to the US and the consequent US determination to hang onto them, he probably believed that his symbolic action would not jeopardize the essentially cordial relations with Washington. As it turned out, however, Marcos' revival of the base issue coincided with a re-examination of US interests in the Far East and US Congressional interest in human rights. Marcos' plan to exploit the American bases has thus backfired and instead focused critical attention on his regime.

The Bases, Human Rights, and Military Aid

The general US global policies of promoting human rights and limiting the sale of conventional arms converge in a manner that greatly complicates the base issue in the Philippines. As part of its negotiating package, Manila has demanded increased military assistance. The suitability of such support and the justification for a new arms transfer agreement have been questioned by the US Congress both because of Manila's human rights record

**The present base agreement will expire in 1991. Negotiations of a new agreement were recessed in October 1976; they are slated to resume this fall.*

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and because it would appear to violate the spirit of the new American arms transfer policy.

Although Marcos is pressing for early resolution of the base issue, he might hesitate to sign a new treaty that would subject him, as part of the ratification process, to closer US Congressional examination of his government's human rights practices. In addition to imperiling the final ratification of the treaty, such scrutiny could jeopardize present military aid and fuel domestic and foreign criticism.* It might also result in new and politically unacceptable human rights-related demands by the US Congress. The Philippine Government may therefore prefer to ride out the current US interest in human rights in hope that over time the policy will be moderated. Meanwhile, Manila has been making selective human rights concessions to avoid possible reductions of its military aid, and Marcos has become a voluble defender of human rights.** He apparently hopes that such actions and the advantages the bases offer the US will protect the flow of arms from rigid application of the new US initiatives.

**Over the last decade, US military aid to the Philippines under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) has declined from \$28.1 million for FY67 to \$18.7 million for FY76. Over the same period, aid under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program has increased from \$0.4 million to \$30.2 million.*

***In addition to his vigorous rhetorical endorsement, Marcos has made some token gestures in support of human rights. For example, slum activist Trinidad Herrera was released in response to high-level US Government pressure, but the officers who allegedly tortured her were subsequently acquitted by a military tribunal. The Philippine Government has released some 2,000 detainees since June, but most of them were actually common criminals. Estimates of the number of political prisoners in the Philippines vary because, under the present martial law regime, they are counted with common criminals. Amnesty International alleges the number to be "several thousand," including former Senator and presidential rival Benigno Aquino.*

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Implications for North-South Relations

The prospect of the application of the new US initiatives to the Philippines and perceptions of reduced US interest in the Far East have reduced Manila's leverage on Washington. Coming at a time when the Philippines apparently has realized that the anticipated benefits of its assertive foreign policy are not immediately forthcoming, the US posture has caused Manila to attempt, at least for the moment, to reinforce its traditional ties with Washington, even at the risk of impairing its Third World status. Moreover, even while calling for far-reaching changes in LDC caucuses, Manila in the past has usually advocated moderate tactics and avoidance of pointed confrontation with industrial nations. Under these circumstances, the Philippines is unlikely to turn to a more radical stance in North-South relations so long as Marcos believes the US will be reasonably responsive to his military needs and accept at face value his efforts to improve his human rights image.

A number of events could, however, force a change in the Philippine posture. If, for example, the US decided to phase out its military bases and concomitantly effect a significant reduction in military sales and aid to the Philippines, Washington would lose much of its leverage over Manila's policies, both foreign and domestic. Should these moves be accompanied by more intrusive US human rights demands, Marcos might feel compelled to abandon his present balancing act and wholeheartedly endorse radical positions within LDC councils. In this context, he could come to regard US charges of human rights violations, as well as resistance to related US demands, as politically advantageous proof that Manila is not Washington's puppet.

In any case, denial of military assistance would force the Philippines to seek alternative suppliers while at the same time seeking to reduce any imminent threats through diplomatic channels. It might try to further these goals through more assertive North-South behavior. Solidarity with other LDCs could reduce the risks involved by providing protective coloring and could offer a channel for weapons from the Communist states that the Philippines either could not or would not utilize while it is linked closely with the US.

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Circumstances beyond US control could also undermine the relationship. For example, if a more radically nationalistic leadership came to power in Manila--possibly from among the junior officers in the armed forces--the Philippines, like Thailand, might choose to shut down the bases, preferring to pay the economic and social costs involved than continue in a position of questionable sovereignty. In this case, too, the Philippines would embrace a policy that stressed separateness from the US. Manila's activities in LDC forums would, in all likelihood, reflect the new orientation of the leadership, becoming more assertive in opposing US positions as a matter of principle.

Renewed energy pressure from OPEC, that is, the threat or actuality of another oil boycott, would markedly increase the urgency of Manila's drive to achieve solidarity with other LDCs and its desire to separate itself from US policy. If the oil situation were perceived as critical, the Philippine Government might make some dramatic move designed to differentiate itself once and for all from the US in the eyes of the world.

On balance, the present Marcos government would probably go to great lengths to avoid alienation of the US and the costs and disruptions such a move would involve. Manila would much prefer to continue its foreign policy ambivalence in order to increase nonaligned credibility without endangering the benefits accruing from its relationship with the US. In terms of the North-South dialogue, it would continue to try to play an ambiguous role even if the G-77 abandoned the present nonconfrontational ambiance. Only if it became impossible to perpetuate its economic and military ties with the US would the Philippines complete the shift to concentrating on the pursuit of its foreign policy goals through G-77 activism.

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ASEAN-US Dialogue: A Halting First Step

The first dialogue between the five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the US held in Manila on 8-10 September presented no surprises to the US but a few disappointments for ASEAN. The ASEAN economic ministers and US representatives exchanged views on a number of regional and global economic issues: the North-South dialogue, commodities and the Common Fund, development cooperation, trade, and private investment. Although satisfied with the exploratory nature of the meeting in general, ASEAN leaders were disappointed with US rejection of key proposals for ASEAN-US cooperation. The ASEAN states will probably continue to pursue such proposals as the establishment of a Stabex (commodity export earnings stabilization) scheme for ASEAN and development assistance for planned regional industrial projects in other forums and in follow-up talks preceding a second dialogue with the US scheduled for next June in Washington. ASEAN states are concerned that US criteria of globalism and universal applicability in economic policies will be used as an excuse to limit responses to ASEAN proposals for special treatment and financial aid.

The ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) attached great political and symbolic importance to their first meeting with the US and appreciated the recognition accorded by the US to the group's role in the development and stability of Southeast Asia. ASEAN spokesman for the meeting, Philippine Foreign Minister Romulo, called the three-day talks historic, and the ASEAN participants recognized the value of the exchange of views on economic issues and welcomed suggestions to continue the dialogue. The ASEAN representatives had come to the meeting with proposals hammered out by their economic ministers, however, and they had hoped for some tangible economic benefits. While they were generally satisfied with the exploratory and informative nature of the exchange on North-South issues, the Common Fund, trade, and private investment, they were less sanguine about the degree of support the US demonstrated for cooperation with ASEAN.

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In particular, the ASEAN participants were disappointed by the bluntness and inflexibility of the US response to their two key proposals: 1) creation of a regional Stabex arrangement and 2) development assistance for regional industrial projects. Speaking for ASEAN, Malaysian Minister of Primary Industries Datuk Musa Hitam made an impassioned plea for US support for a Stabex arrangement for the region similar to that contained in the EC's Lome Convention, and for progress in the November Common Fund negotiations. The opposition of the US to the Stabex concept, even though it agreed in principle to support other means of dealing effectively with stabilization of commodity prices, convinced the ASEAN representatives and Malaysia in particular that there is a need to promote these goals more effectively. A major commodity producer, Malaysia is most concerned with both global and regional solutions to improving its export earnings from tin and rubber. It is likely that Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn and Director of Economic Planning Thong Yaw Hong will pursue the issue of commodities, an ASEAN Stabex scheme, and the Common Fund during their visit to Washington in late September.

ASEAN made a similar request of Japan for a Stabex arrangement at consultations held in early August. Although Japan balked at supporting such a scheme, it tried to conceal its unresponsiveness with promises of further bilateral aid, specifically for ASEAN industrial projects. The Japanese have pledged \$1 billion for capital intensive projects, such as petrochemical fertilizer and diesel engine plants. The ASEAN nations also presented the US with comprehensive lists of aid requests, including feasibility studies, technical training, and grants and loans in support of present and future regional industrial projects. The US reply that no direct capital assistance for industrial projects could be provided because current bilateral aid policies emphasized "basic human needs" was received by some ASEAN members as an excuse to sidestep a commitment to cooperation.

From ASEAN's point of view, the US rejection of support for a Stabex arrangement and the ASEAN industrialization scheme was balanced in this first dialogue by favorable responses on broadening the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), improving access of ASEAN products

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to the US through the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), and encouraging US private investment in ASEAN member states by giving careful consideration to tax deferral policies. Nevertheless, ASEAN expectations, like those of most LDCs, for more concrete and tangible benefits from the US in the future will persist. [REDACTED]

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LDC Attitudes Toward Monitoring the North-South Dialogue

One of the major issues unresolved at CIEC and now on the agenda of the 32nd UN General Assembly concerns establishment of an "overview mechanism" to monitor the North-South dialogue. While there is consensus among LDC spokesmen on the desirability of such a mechanism, there are substantial differences over the form it should take. Most LDCs have been reluctant to endorse publicly any specific proposals. Behind the scenes, however, some of the most influential LDCs appear to be encouraging support for using the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as the overview mechanism. This proposal is linked to LDC efforts to restructure ECOSOC in order to enhance their authority over the organization.

* * *

In preparing for this year's UN General Assembly session, the LDCs' caucusing group (the "Group of 77") has been unable to develop a bloc position on the nature of the mechanism that should succeed the CIEC to monitor the progress of discussions between industrial and developing countries on the latter's demands for changes in international political and economic relationships. Currently, the LDCs are divided over the issue of whether what is now referred to as the "overview mechanism" should be established within existing UN forums with broad membership or through the creation of a specialized economic group with a limited membership.

Those LDCs that have generally played very active roles in the North-South dialogue and that have at times pushed the General Assembly and other large UN conferences into confrontations with the industrialized countries over G-77 demands, now appear to favor creation of a restricted, specialized overview committee where, presumably, confrontation would be less likely to occur.

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The list of countries who support such an overview mechanism reads like a roster of "radicals" in North-South relations: Venezuela, Algeria, Jamaica, Guyana, Sudan, and Pakistan. In the cases of Venezuela, Algeria, and Jamaica, especially, support for a new specialized committee with restricted membership is surprising in light of the difficulties they had in representing the interests of all members of the G-77 in the CIEC. The support of a more specialized overview mechanism by these self-styled radicals may be another indication of the degree to which they now wish to encourage practical substantive bargaining on North-South issues.*

Those LDCs that are strongest in their support of an overview mechanism within existing forums include countries that traditionally have been anxious to reduce rhetoric and avoid confrontation on North-South issues (for example, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia). The two options most frequently suggested are the General Assembly itself or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). These countries seem to be particularly resistant to the idea of a new, restricted membership body because of the experience some had at CIEC. In such a restricted forum, where each participant was selected to represent a regional viewpoint, they found it difficult to pursue both national interests and moderate courses of action without being accused by the rest of the G-77 of weakening unity or softening bloc demands. In addition, some opponents of a special economic group point out that its projected functions are among those originally envisioned for ECOSOC and that it might downgrade the role and status of ECOSOC.

Using ECOSOC (which has 54 rotating members) as the overview mechanism may emerge as the most acceptable alternative for G-77 members, including the radicals. The General Assembly is considered by many to be too big for effective discussion of substantive issues. A report on restructuring ECOSOC is expected during this General Assembly session. As part of their overall quest for more authority in international institutions, the developing

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countries will seek structural changes in ECOSOC to enhance their control over the organization. If LDCs were to acquire such influence over ECOSOC, they may well be able to coalesce and rally behind the proposal that it become the North-South overview mechanism. In the absence of such a development, G-77 leaders will probably not push the issue, preferring instead to wait for initiatives from the developed countries. This tactic would allow the G-77 to delay developing a bloc position and deflect criticism of specific proposals to the industrialized countries.

In any case, the issue of an overview mechanism will remain important to the LDCs, since they believe a continuation of the North-South dialogue is needed to effect a distribution of wealth and power in international affairs. From their vantage point what is sought is not only momentum in the dialogue, but greater LDC control over it. They believe their goals would be less well served if the dialogue shifted entirely to negotiations in existing specialized forums as advocated by the industrial nations.

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Japan in the North-South Dialogue

This is the fourth in a series of articles on the policy of industrial countries toward the specific economic demands of the LDCs in the North-South dialogue. It foresees a continuation of Japan's traditionally low profile in multilateral economic negotiations between developed and developing countries. Although Japan has a strong economic stake in good relations with LDCs, it will avoid taking the initiative in the North-South dialogue and will retain a predominantly negative attitude toward LDC demands for a substantial change in the existing international economic order. As in the past, however, Japan's desire to keep in step with other developed states will lead it to acquiesce if its OECD partners agree on measures like the establishment of a common fund for commodities or a major increase in development assistance.

The Foundations of Japanese Policy

Japan probably has a more direct and important stake in maintaining effective economic ties with developing countries than any other major OECD state. With virtually no raw material base of its own, it is almost totally dependent on imports from the OPEC states and other raw material suppliers, many of whom are in the Third World. In addition, LDCs--particularly rapidly developing Asian ones such as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan--are increasingly important export markets for Japan. Their demand for manufactured goods is growing just at a time when Japan needs to sell more to them. Sluggish domestic growth has forced Japanese industry to push foreign sales, while slow growth and rising protectionist sentiment in key OECD markets has enhanced the relative importance of LDC outlets.

Japanese foreign investment and aid efforts have been heavily concentrated in those few LDCs that have special supply and/or market importance, such as the OPEC and ASEAN states, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan.

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Japan has not greatly helped those LDCs that are less important to it economically. Thus, for example, it devotes a smaller share of its GNP to development assistance than does any other major industrial country. Tokyo has pledged to boost aid flows over the next few years, at least in part to offset its burgeoning current account surplus, but assistance will still be heavily directed to Southeast Asia, and its level will remain well below the OECD average.

Present Japanese Policy in the
North-South Dialogue

Japan's primary aim in the North-South dialogue has been to minimize the economic and political costs of the outcome. On the economic level, its reluctance to interfere with the operation of the market or make major financial outlays that carry little direct economic benefit has led it to oppose measures like a common fund, generalized debt relief, or greatly increased development assistance. But it has also been unwilling to risk bad relations with those LDCs on whom it depends for markets and supplies. Japan has therefore felt some pressure based on its own economic self-interest to soften its position on these issues. As is the case with most industrialized countries, the Foreign Ministry is the chief advocate in Japan of responsiveness to LDC economic demands, while the Finance Ministry has been far more reluctant to make any potentially costly commitments.

The Foreign Ministry's interest notwithstanding, Japan has little desire for political leadership in North-South relations. Even in as important a region to them as Southeast Asia, the Japanese still see their primary role as economic. Although they are interested in expanding their multilateral contacts in the area, they remain deeply concerned that they not be perceived as a political surrogate for the US. At the same time, Tokyo is unwilling to adopt any regionally centered format for its economic relations that might suggest a costly precedent for its other trading partners or complicate its position in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).

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The political caution that Japan shows in its relations with Southeast Asia is perhaps the leading characteristic of its foreign policy. It is even less inclined than West Germany to use its considerable economic power for external political aims. Japan's main political goal in the North-South dialogue is basically a negative one: to avoid isolation in the negotiations as the lone opponent of LDC demands. Thus it held the line with the US and West Germany as long as they retained a steadfastly negative attitude toward LDC claims. But it went along when they decided to accept the \$1 billion special assistance fund and the idea of establishing a common fund at the Paris CIEC this spring.

Outlook

Japan may have more at stake economically in the North-South dialogue than any other industrialized country. It may be more responsible than any other for LDC dissatisfaction with unstable commodity prices because it is the prime importer of several raw materials and its demand for such products fluctuates. But it is, nevertheless, less active politically than any of its peers in the North-South dialogue.

As the dialogue evolves, Japan will continue to let its OECD partners take the initiative in formulating developed states policy, although it will watch carefully for any change in their attitudes. As long as the other major industrial states do not go too far in making costly concessions to LDC demands, Japan will almost certainly agree with whatever they decide. If the US and West Germany resisted LDC claims, Japan would probably be even happier in siding with them. In general, then, the Japanese are likely to pay closest attention to US policy in assessing the need for shifts in its position.

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The LDCs and the 32nd General Assembly

In a somewhat distorted way, UN meetings reflect many of the basic trends and developments in world politics. The 32nd General Assembly, which opened on 20 September, is likely to mirror the high importance that issues in dispute between the developing and industrialized countries have taken in recent years. At least at the start, Assembly deliberations on these issues will reflect the tentative spirit of accommodation that has characterized North-South relations over the past year--a searching for practical solutions through give-and-take bargaining. The final tone of the session is more difficult to anticipate, since it will depend heavily on LDC perceptions of Western, particularly US, initiatives outside the Assembly.

Since the tumultuous 1974 General Assembly session, many of the LDCs have moderated their conduct in international meetings. Several factors have contributed to their growing pragmatism:

- A growing awareness of the political, economic, and cultural diversities within the group has led many to question the value of LDC unity in making far-reaching demands for change in international economic and political institutions in the face of possible damage to their own interests. Many have adopted a policy of maintaining the appearance of cohesion in multilateral meetings, while preferring to conduct relations with the industrial countries bilaterally or regionally.
- The US administration's willingness to negotiate issues of importance to the LDCs strengthened the more moderate of the developing countries, who were ultimately able to exert greater influence on group caucuses.

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- OPEC, despite past assurances of support for LDC causes, did not use the oil weapon as a lever to exact concessions from industrialized countries, as many LDCs and developed countries thought might happen.

Many LDCs have begun to develop a sharper sense of when and in what forum to raise particular issues. Because the General Assembly can only make recommendations and assign action on issues to specific bodies, LDCs are beginning to believe that confrontational tactics in the Assembly only serve to antagonize unnecessarily those countries which must underwrite the economic benefits they need. Nevertheless, there will inevitably be moments of conflict between the developing and industrialized countries at this session. But in most cases behind-the-scenes bargaining will serve to minimize the negative effects of public posturing.

Some Areas of Potential Conflict

The debates in the Assembly on southern Africa (Namibia, Rhodesia, and apartheid in South Africa) are likely to be quite heated--especially in view of the recent death in jail of South African black activist leader Steve Biko. African leaders appear generally disinclined to risk action at the Assembly which might negatively affect the current Western initiatives to promote majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia.

If, however, these efforts collapse or if new rioting or further government repression occurs in South Africa, the African states will probably become aggressive in pushing for resolutions in the Assembly and Security Council that demand UN action against South Africa. Resolutions calling for mandatory sanctions will put the Western members of the Security Council in a difficult position. A veto could jeopardize US credibility with the black African states.

Another issue which will fuel the debates is the alleged South African intention to explode a nuclear device. This issue was a major behind-the-scenes concern of black Africans at the recent Lagos antiapartheid conference. Western nuclear cooperation with South Africa, though roundly criticized, did not develop into a major

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issue then, in part because the Soviets chose not to use the occasion to draw a strong connection between South Africa's nuclear program and Western aid. The Soviets, however, plan to raise the issue in the Assembly debates on apartheid, along with attacks on the West for cooperating with Pretoria.

The Arab states' assessment of the prospects for forward movement in the peace negotiating process this fall will determine their position in Assembly debates on the Middle East.

For the moment the Arabs are undecided on how hard to push issues such as Palestinian rights and Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Earlier this month at the Cairo Arab League meeting, Egypt was able only with some difficulty to beat back Syrian proposals that would have had the Arabs press for Israel's expulsion from the UN and for economic sanctions against Israel.

Much will depend on the outcome of the meetings this month and next between US officials and the foreign ministers of Israel and the Arab countries. If the meetings fail to produce progress, Syria and the more militant Arab states are likely to press for additional hard-line resolutions in the General Assembly and perhaps the Security Council, both for public consumption at home and to demonstrate their frustration with US policy.

Of more fundamental concern to the LDCs as a bloc than such political issues are proposals concerning economic development and debt relief. They probably realize, however, that the General Assembly is not the proper forum for discussing these issues. In November there will be a meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development to discuss the creation of a common fund for commodities. LDCs want the fund to protect them from world price fluctuations for their raw materials. If a sense of cooperation in North-South relations is to continue, LDCs will expect something tangible to come out of this meeting.

The LDCs demonstrated their determination to keep up the pressure on the industrialized states at the meeting of the 31st General Assembly called to assess the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). The Group of 77 tabled a resolution critical of the performance of the industrialized states at CIEC. The industrialized

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countries argued that concessions had been made to LDC demands and that the resolution should be more balanced. The meeting was extended beyond the scheduled deadline in an effort to work out a consensus resolution, but the effort failed. Instead of hardening positions, however, the weary delegates simply agreed to remand the issues to the 32nd session.

The LDC demands for a reordering of the international economic structure have been accompanied by related calls for a restructuring of international technical and economic organizations. The Assembly will deal formally with this issue when it considers the proposal to restructure the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

That debate may be complicated by the question of creating an oversight mechanism for North-South issues. The LDCs are likely to lean toward a structure that gives them more authority. Their perceptions of the willingness of the industrialized countries to consider alterations in the power relationship in international bodies will determine how contentious this issue will become.*

Outlook

Recent US initiatives in relations with the LDCs have contributed to the current moderate environment in which multilateral negotiations are taking place. Thus, this Assembly has the potential to be more constructive than past sessions. Nevertheless, LDCs will expect the industrialized states to translate words into action and will test them in the months ahead both at the Assembly and in other forums. A breakdown in economic negotiations, a stalemate in the Middle East peace process, or a disruption of the negotiations to extend majority rule to black Africans in southern Africa could cause a serious deterioration in the negotiating climate of the Assembly.

**See the article in this issue on "LDC Attitudes Toward Monitoring the North-South Dialogue," pp. 16-18.*

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HUMAN RIGHTS

The following articles focus on the human rights situations in two Asian countries. In Indonesia, an authoritarian military regime holds some 30,000 political prisoners. In North Korea, the rigidly repressive dictatorship approaches the pure totalitarian model.

Communist ideology is closely related to human rights conditions in both countries. The political prisoner issue in Indonesia is a legacy of the abortive Communist-inspired coup of October 1965. Grim human conditions in North Korea are the result of Kim Il-song's ruthless determination to impose his unique brand of Communism.

Indonesia has found heightened international interest in its human rights situation discomfiting. As with a number of other authoritarian regimes, Jakarta has had to reconsider its rationale for holding political prisoners, and it is now engaged in balancing the security risks inherent in their release against the consequences of international disapprobation. The article on Indonesia explores key factors involved in this process.

No such process is under way in Pyongyang, however, where the regime is largely unconcerned about the mainstream of international opinion and the US stand on human rights is irrelevant. The article on North Korea describes what life is like in a society based on the effective denial of nearly all fundamental personal and political rights.

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Human Rights and Indonesian-US Relations

The issue of human rights in Indonesia has been a source of strain in Indonesian-US relations since it was first tied to US security assistance to that country in 1974. Subsequent congressional hearings have focused on the more than 30,000 people detained for political reasons since 1965 and on allegations that the Indonesian armed forces have been engaged in a campaign of "genocide" against the population of East Timor. The Suharto government's recent steps toward releasing political prisoners have come largely in response to international criticism of its human rights policies, but there are limits to how far it will go in cooperating. Maintenance of the momentum achieved thus far in improving Indonesia's human rights performance will depend on how the Suharto government balances its concerns about threats to internal security with its regard for international opinion.

This article examines the origins of Indonesia's human rights situation with particular regard to the political detainees, discusses the domestic dynamics involved, and analyzes how the Suharto government is likely to respond to various kinds of external stimuli.

Human Rights--The Indonesian View

Senior Indonesian officials admit that a human rights problem exists in their country, but they contend that cultural differences and unique security and development problems must be considered in evaluating Indonesia's performance. Indonesians emphasize that human rights encompass the right to adequate food, clothing, and shelter as well as political rights and civil liberties. In a country where poverty, crowding, and chronic malnutrition are endemic, the right to basic human necessities and survival is considered paramount. Indonesians believe, too, that the US is preoccupied with the civil and political side of human rights--elements that are seen as less relevant in the Indonesian context. Cultural traditions, moreover,

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value the social group above the individual, and policies that promote individual rights often at the expense of social welfare are seen as morally corrupt. In short, Indonesians place more emphasis on responsibilities than rights.

The Suharto government has concentrated on the provision of basic human necessities through promotion of rapid social and economic development. Behind this approach lies a concern for political stability. Indonesia's leaders believe that by raising living standards they can avert the exploitation of persistent sources of discontent by Communist and other dissident groups. The regime's first five-year plan (1969-74) emphasized rapid economic growth; the second plan (1975-80) stresses "social justice" and measures to address social dislocations created by rapid modernization. The primacy of political and social stability and the subordination of individual political freedoms to the collective goal of national economic progress are an implicit assumption in these development plans. Indonesia contends that the very process of modernization creates social and political unrest, which if not controlled by strong security measures, could result in anarchy and economic disaster.

Security Concerns

The Suharto government has thus responded to US human rights initiatives by emphasizing its concern about internal security. The government believes that subversion constitutes a constant and serious threat to the country's integrity and security. The line between dissent and subversion is finely drawn, however, and the Suharto government's preoccupation with security has been characterized by some foreign observers as paranoia. But the military government's concerns are based on deep convictions acquired from past experience--the 32-year history of the Republic of Indonesia has been one of continuous clashes between its scores of different ethnic and religious groups, some of which have climaxed in regional attempts to secede from the Java-centric republic.

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The impact of the abortive Communist-inspired coup of 30 September 1965, which produced widespread civil violence and near anarchy for a year, is an important factor in contemporary Indonesian political life, because the potential for a recurrence of violence and disorder is perceived as high. Many of the sources of previous civil strife still fester despite measures to improve economic and social conditions. The military government's fear of Communist subversion is intensified by the fact that the Indonesian Communist Party had resurrected itself by 1965 from military defeats in two previous coup attempts--in 1926 against the Dutch and in 1948 against the fledgling Indonesian Republic. The government feels that any relaxation of its vigilance would lead to an eruption and believes that its fears have been realized on two occasions: the brief period of liberalism in 1973 that was followed by antigovernment riots in Jakarta in 1974; and the period of political campaigning prior to the May 1977 general election that led some religious mystics and Muslim extremists to challenge Suharto's leadership and disrupt the campaign.

The Political Detainee Issue

The issue of the political detainees is a legacy of the abortive Communist-inspired coup of 1965. The military government, which took power to restore order and eradicate Communist influence, arrested several hundred thousand people on suspicion of complicity in the coup or for Communist sympathies. Many of those detained in 1965-66 or for later subversive activities have been released, but some 35,000 people--according to Indonesia's figures--remained in detention as of late 1976. The government has professed fear that the mass release of thousands whom many Indonesians consider to be hard-line Communist revolutionaries might rekindle public disorders, yet it lacks the evidence and the judicial capacity to bring the bulk of the prisoners to trial.

The basis of this policy of detention began to be questioned in the mid-1970s by both domestic and international human rights groups. The Indonesian Council of Churches and the Catholic hierarchy, civil rights and legal reform groups, and some nationalists have expressed concern about the continued detention of unaccused people and the legal system's inability to resolve the issue satisfactorily.

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Indonesians are extremely sensitive to foreign criticism or to hints of interference in their domestic affairs and have tended to react with nationalist fervor to airings of their human rights policies by such organizations as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the UN Human Rights Commission, and the US Congress. Nevertheless, President Suharto's concern about Indonesia's international image has prompted him seriously to address the issue of the political detainees. He is concerned that Western nations will conclude that Indonesia is a harsh dictatorship, and he is especially worried that the US might reduce its development and security assistance. Indonesia is also eager to defuse discussion of its human rights policies in such international forums as the International Labor Organization and the UN General Assembly.

Thus, despite fears about internal security and dislike of international interference, the Suharto government has decided that Indonesia must take the risks associated with releasing the detainees and adjust to changes in international attitudes on human rights. President Suharto announced a timetable for release of the 35,000 remaining detainees on 1 December 1976, and he appears to be abiding by it. In December 1976 2,500 were released; 10,000 are scheduled to be released in 1977; 10,000 in 1978; and the remainder in 1979. Fewer than 1,800 will be put on trial.

Unresolved Problems

The prisoner release program has been hampered by problems in implementation. The program is overly ambitious for Indonesia's woefully inadequate legal and administrative systems, and it may be impossible to execute within the time allotted. The government's perception of its ability to proceed with the releases depends on three elements: 1) acceptance of the former prisoners by the outside community; 2) their employment; and 3) their rehabilitation. Some security officials are concerned that if the detainees are released too rapidly, the populace--especially the conservative Muslims--will protest, perhaps violently.*

**A large part of the 1965-66 "bloodbath" was a Muslim holy war against "atheist Communists."*

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Some Muslim groups are outspokenly opposed to the release, and many local officials are reluctant to allow detainees to resettle in their areas because of Muslim antipathy and the prospect of social ostracism of the detainees by villagers.

Finding employment is difficult for any Indonesian because of overpopulation and a limited job market, and it will be even harder for anyone imprisoned for 10 years, without connections, and "tainted." The government has attempted to give the released detainees job training, and it has relaxed requirements for certification of noninvolvement in the 1965 coup. In the past, such certification was required for everyone who was over 12 years of age in 1965 for many skilled and unskilled jobs. Now it will be needed only for civil service positions, the armed forces, university teaching, high-level commercial, and other "vital" positions.

Release is also conditioned on the rehabilitation of the detainee, that is, on his renunciation of Communism and allegiance to the *Pancasila*, the five principles of the republic.* Those released are placed on probation for one year and "reeducated" to permit them to return to society. Some recalcitrants have been rearrested. Indeed, many detainees admit that their years of imprisonment have turned them even more firmly toward Communism and against the Suharto regime.

The government believes that it has found an effective solution to reintegration problems--resettlement of those released in areas outside of populous Java. Communist influence was strongest among the landless farmers on Java, and most of the detainees are Javanese. Their resettlement as farmers in newly opened areas on other islands supposedly would provide them with a livelihood, while reducing both the security risk to the government and the possibility of conflict with other social groups. Transmigration of people from crowded Java (where population densities reach 1,000 to 1,500 persons per sq. km. in many areas) to other islands on a voluntary basis has been a major program in the government's development plans for many years.

**Belief in the one supreme God, just and civilized humanity, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.*

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The international groups concerned about the plight of political prisoners are generally critical of these Indonesian efforts and plans. Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists have disputed Indonesia's figure of 35,000 detainees, claiming that nearly 100,000 prisoners remain, and they have charged that prisoners are systematically abused. Exact figures are difficult to substantiate, and it is likely that not even the Indonesians know definitely how many detainees there are at any given time.* Prominent Indonesian civil rights activists who are themselves former political detainees believe, however, that systematic torture has not been practiced since 1970, and that the figure of 100,000 detainees is exaggerated.** Indonesian officials also point out that prisoners receive adequate food and health care and are no worse off than the average Indonesian who lives on a subsistence level with an annual per capita income of less than \$200.

Indonesian Policy Options and Relations With the US

The government is attempting to resolve the problem of the detainees, but it is proceeding in accordance

**While some are being released, others are being rearrested or reclassified. Prisoners detained as a result of the 1965 coup attempt are classified into categories reflecting their status: Category A includes those known to have been directly involved with the coup plotters and who the government says will be tried. This category includes many of the parliamentarians listed recently by Amnesty International as being imprisoned without trial. Category B includes those strongly suspected of involvement but for whom evidence is lacking. These are currently being reclassified into categories A or C. Category C comprises those detainees who can be released after a period of rehabilitation. A final category, X, groups those who have not been classified.*

***The AI and ICJ charges apparently draw heavily on reports collected and disseminated by TAPOL (Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners), a group organized by Mrs. Carmel Budiardjo, a former member of the British Communist Party married to an Indonesian Communist Party member who has been incarcerated since 1965.*

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with its own calculation of tolerable security risks, and there undoubtedly are limits to how far it will go in releasing large numbers of suspected hardcore Communists, allowing them to return to former homes, and restoring their political rights. Some detainees who are considered potential revolutionaries will probably never be released. In the near future, the Suharto government will seek to avoid a confrontation or to jeopardize US goodwill and will probably continue its dialogue with the US and with international organizations concerned with human rights. It has responded favorably to suggestions that the legal and administrative systems be improved and that prisoners be treated in accordance with internationally accepted standards. Nevertheless, the government's reactions to US human rights initiatives will undoubtedly continue to strain bilateral relations.

Maintenance of the momentum achieved thus far in settling the political prisoner issue and improving Indonesia's human rights performance in general will depend largely on how the Suharto government balances its concerns about threats to internal security with its regard for international opinion. The government has taken the steps it has largely in response to international pressure, even though it is highly sensitive about this "interference." It probably hopes that the "conditioned" and gradual implementation of the release program will satisfy the US and international groups while not posing an intolerable security risk.

Indonesia could probably be persuaded to abide by the timetable and perhaps eliminate some of the program's "conditions" if additional pressure were applied in a low-key, nonthreatening manner. Quiet diplomacy is congenial to the traditional Indonesian style of negotiation--establishing interpersonal rapport and building a workable consensus. President Suharto and his colleagues have been eager to establish direct contact and exchange views with the executive and legislative branches of the US Government as well as with influential academic and commercial circles. President Suharto met personally with Presidents Nixon and Ford, and he has repeatedly expressed his desire to meet with President Carter.

Despite its willingness to cooperate (within limits), if the release program is perceived as provoking social unrest or encouraging dissident activity,

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the government might both halt further releases and impose more stringent security measures generally. Security officials dubious about the wisdom of the release program are likely to be keenly alert to any signs of dissidence that can be brought to Suharto's attention. An increase in domestic social disorder could also undermine the leadership of Suharto. Military officers of a more authoritarian point of view may conclude that he has compromised internal security and the position of the military government.

A level of international pressure that was perceived as excessive and insensitive could cause a nationalistic backlash even without adverse incidents. Given the nature of the Indonesians' security concerns, their high degree of sensitivity to foreign criticism, and their tendency to assume that others are conspiring against them, Indonesia may conclude that the price of satisfying external critics is too high, that is, that the potential consequences of international condemnation and US ire are less painful than are the security risks that would have to be taken to improve substantially and permanently the country's human rights image.

President Suharto has stated that he is prepared to go elsewhere for military and economic assistance if the US links its aid to human rights and ignores the cultural and political aspects of the situation in Indonesia. Hence, US initiatives on human rights may affect Indonesia's positions on other international issues of concern to the US. The Indonesians have already concluded that a degree of self-reliance and economic independence is necessary. In the mid-1970s Indonesia was faced with Communist victories in Indochina, a lower US profile in Southeast Asia, and economic recession. Disappointed with US military assistance programs, the Suharto government has approached other nations--the UK, West Germany, France, Yugoslavia, South Korea, and Taiwan--for arms and assistance. Linking security assistance to human rights could cause Indonesia to expand its efforts to seek arms from other suppliers, including the Communist nations, and thus create tensions over arms transfer restraints.

In an effort to diversify its economic ties and reduce its dependency on the US, Indonesia has already turned to other industrialized nations (particularly

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Japan) and to multilateral and international organizations for advice and assistance. It has also placed a higher priority on regional cooperation to promote economic and social development and political stability. Indonesia has been active as a leading "moderate" in Third World demands for a New International Economic Order. It could adopt a more radical and confrontational stance in international economic negotiations being conducted as part of the North-South dialogue if it felt that US attempts to influence human rights performance (for example, by opposing loans to Indonesia from international financial institutions) were a threat to its economic and political stability. As a prominent member of the nonaligned movement, moreover, Indonesia values its Third World credentials and could simply refuse to cooperate on human rights to demonstrate that it is not a lackey of the US.

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Human Rights in North Korea

Kim Il-song commands a dictatorial regime in which social controls and regimentation are so severe that some other Communist countries look like open societies in comparison. Constant indoctrination and pervasive security controls have been the rule for the past 30 years, and fundamental human rights as they are known in the West simply do not exist.

This article focuses on the human condition in North Korea. It is based on the testimony of defectors and on the accounts of occasional foreign visitors. The picture is grim. Even allowing for distortion and exaggeration in some of the accounts, it is clear that conditions have grown worse over the years--reflecting the incremental imposition of the clearest contemporary example of the totalitarian society.

The Great Leader Kim Il-song

The North Korean people have no democratic tradition. They went directly from Japanese and Soviet colonialism to the rule of Kim Il-song. Nurtured by the Soviets after World War II, Kim took over as Premier when the DPRK was established in 1948. He became President in 1972 when a new constitution was promulgated. Kim has ruthlessly purged all competing elements, built up a charismatic cult around himself, and imposed upon North Korea his own brand of Communism--an attempt to adapt Marxist-Leninist principles to historical and cultural conditions peculiar to the country.

The heart of Kim's monolithic ideology is the concept of *chuch'e* (self-reliance) which holds that the Korean masses are the masters of their revolution and entitled to its material rewards. They must, however, fully accept Communist values. Kim is attempting to create a unique political culture that permeates all attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and institutions. He seeks nothing less than the molding of "a new man."

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Rights and Duties

North Korea's 1972 constitution enumerates a wide range of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and press, together with the right to freely elect public officials. These rights are effectively overridden, however, by other clauses, including those that list the duties of North Korean citizens.

- Article 49 states that an individual exists only for the benefit of the collective whole.
- Article 67 states that "citizens must strictly observe the laws of the state and the socialist norms of life and the socialist rules of conduct."
- Article 68 requires citizens to "strictly display a high degree of collective spirit" and "to work . . . devotedly for the sake of society and the people and for the sake of the homeland and the revolution."
- Articles 11 and 71 describe opponents of the "socialist system" as "hostile elements" and call for revolutionary vigilance against them.
- Article 136 specifies that the principal role of the courts is to protect "the socialist system," not the rights of individual citizens.

The freedoms of assembly and association are curtailed by Article 10 of the constitution, which states that all political activities are governed by the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship. The ruling Korean Workers Party (KWP) dictates a person's occupation and residence. All travel within the country must be given prior approval, and there is no unofficial travel permitted outside the country. A single slate of candidates is presented for elections. Voting is obligatory--if a citizen is ill, the ballot box is brought to his home.

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Religious freedom is promised in Article 54, but this same clause also calls for "anti-religious propaganda." Christians, who prior to the advent of the Communist regime in 1945 numbered several hundred thousand, have been singled out for particularly severe social persecution. In seeking to control the Buddhists and Christians in the late 1940s, Pyongyang made membership in the Korean Christians Federation and the Korean Buddhists League obligatory. These organizations still exist, but they are no longer functioning and have no real membership. Pyongyang uses them as propaganda tools to criticize South Korea's domestic policies and show the outside world that North Korea has "religious freedoms." Representatives of these dummy groups occasionally attend international religious conferences.

To reinforce its facade of democracy and maintain the fiction of a united front, the government sanctions two so-called minority parties. Both the Korean Democratic Party and the Chondoist Chongu Party had active membership in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Today they have only a roster of officials. Each has a token number of seats in the Supreme Peoples Assembly--the rubberstamp legislature--and the head of the Korean Democratic Party serves as one of the country's three vice presidents.

Mechanisms of Social Control

North Korea forces its citizens to conform to social standards by requiring them to devote their leisure hours to state-run activities and by maintaining an elaborate internal security machine.

Meetings can only be held under strict party control, and no association can be formed outside party channels. Everyone over the age of nine is required to join an appropriate social organization, such as the Junior Boys and Girls Corps, the Socialist Working Youth League, and the Womens League. In addition, youths serve in the militia, and workers and farmers must be affiliated with an occupational organization. Workers are required to spend several hours a day in political indoctrination sessions.

Internal security is provided by the Ministry of Public Security and the State Political Security

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Department (SPSD). The first organization has existed since 1945. It is in charge of both general police and covert intelligence activities. The SPSP was formed in February 1973 to strengthen efforts at identifying political dissidents; it reports directly to Kim Il-song. Between the two groups, all government offices, factories, social organizations, and neighborhood units are infiltrated. Moreover, families are organized into small groups to watch each other and report suspicious activities.

An additional layer of control--particularly in the case of government and party offices, the military, and industrial facilities--is provided by the KWP's Organization and Guidance Department. Now apparently headed by Kim Chong-il, the son of Kim Il-song, this department frequently uses the reissuance of party membership cards as an opportunity to reinvestigate the backgrounds of a large segment of the populace.

Social Discrimination

One product of these investigations is a rigid system of social classification that is based on a person's family background and estimated political reliability. In determining family background, investigations go back three generations, with particular emphasis on the status of the family during the Japanese colonial period (1910-45).

Persons who themselves or whose family served in the Japanese occupation government; were landlords, capitalists, or intellectuals during that period; are relatives of defectors or of residents of South Korea; were Christians; or collaborated with the UN forces during the war are considered ideologically hostile. These people are kept under strict surveillance and denied opportunities for advanced education and careers in the KWP or military. They have been periodically rounded up and relocated to remote areas.

For those at the opposite extreme of the social scale--the hardcore loyalists--preferential treatment in all walks of life is available, including access to advanced education and comparatively lucrative careers as party and military officers. These people have no

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greater degree of political freedom, but they may receive better housing, more generous rations, and more liberal travel privileges than the majority of their fellow countrymen.

Daily Life

For the bulk of the North Korean population--those who are neither particularly persecuted nor favored--the daily routine can only be characterized as grim. Most North Koreans work seven days a week under a rigid schedule that consumes almost all waking hours. For many, normal family life, as it is known in the West, is all but impossible.

A typical worker's day begins at 0600 with the blare of a loudspeaker outside his apartment building.* The worker's family usually goes out to fetch breakfast from a nearby state-run kitchen. Meals are rarely cooked in the home, especially if both husband and wife work. Lunches are usually eaten in huge dining halls serving thousands of local workers. Evening meals, if not eaten at work, are picked up at the state kitchens on the way home. All meals are paid for with state-issued ration cards.

Children are usually left all day at schools or nurseries. After the children are dropped off most parents commute to work by public transportation. No private vehicles other than bicycles are permitted. Everyone must carry credentials and ration cards when out of the home; there are severe penalties for being caught without them. The work day begins at 0800 with a 30-minute lecture in the factory or office based on the morning news. A party cadre reads items from the party newspaper, *Nodong Sinmun*, and all must listen attentively, usually to reports about what Kim Il-song

**One is almost never out of earshot of a loudspeaker in North Korea. They feed the people a steady stream of nationalistic music and propaganda, focusing invariably on three favorite themes: the surpassing of production goals, the glorification of Kim Il-song, and the need to fight North Korea's enemies.*

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has been doing or saying.* At the end of each morning meeting, all must pledge their intense loyalty to the "Great Leader" Kim Il-song and vow to increase production. Similar indoctrination sessions are held at the schools.

An average worker is subject to a daily schedule that leaves him exhausted at the end of the day. He works at his job until 1300. After lunch, he naps or tends to personal matters until he returns to work at 1500 or 1600 and works again until 2000 or 2030. After work, he must remain for a two-hour compulsory political study session, in which the writings of Kim Il-song are read and discussed in depth. A party cadre leads the session.** Everyone must participate actively, for those who show less than absolute enthusiasm are liable to be accused of antiparty and antirevolutionary tendencies, a charge that can have dire consequences.

A 30-minute period for mutual and self-criticism closes each study session. Even the most intimate family or personal matters are subject to discussion. Public confessions are demanded for every thought or action that could be interpreted as being directed against the party or the party line. Once the session is concluded, the worker hurries home, has his evening meal--if he has not already eaten at work--and usually goes to bed. As the family sleeps, the solemn countenance of the father-leader Kim Il-song silently watches from his post on the wall. Outside, the loudspeakers are finally silent.

**There is strict control and censorship of all publications and news media in North Korea. All news is disseminated through official news agencies under control by the KWP. No criticism of the party or government is permitted.*

***Married women usually finish work at 1800 and therefore have their study sessions earlier. They return home about 2030, picking up the children and the evening meal along the way.*


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Conclusion

North Korea's almost complete isolation from the outside world* has allowed Kim Il-song to build and maintain what could be the world's most rigid social system. North Koreans are told that they live in the best of all possible societies and that "provocations" from the United States or other external forces are the main causes of any difficulties their country faces. North Korea is, in short, a society that approaches the pure totalitarian model based on the effective denial of nearly all fundamental personal and political rights.



**Media control is almost absolute. Only a few select officials are permitted to leave the country on official business. Foreign visitors, even from other Communist countries, are prevented from having contact with ordinary North Koreans.*

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The PLO: From Terrorism to Diplomacy

While states continue to play the dominant role in the international arena, nonstate entities are increasingly important in international politics. Various transnational groupings, such as multinational corporations or loosely organized political movements (for example, Eurocommunism), as well as subnational entities, including separatist movements, terrorist groups, and local governments (for example, cities), are increasingly able to conduct activities which have a global impact. The following paper examines the efforts of one such group, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to win acceptance as a responsible spokesman for the interests of a nascent state.

The PLO originally served solely as an umbrella organization for numerous Palestinian guerrilla groups. The organization gained world attention in the late 1970s, when its member groups carried out a series of international terrorist attacks within Israel as well as outside the Middle East. Following the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, however, Arab attitudes changed, and this led to pressures in the PLO to deemphasize terrorism as a political tool. Most Arab states had come to believe that terrorism was counterproductive, that it not only failed to inflict serious damage on Israel, but also damaged Arab prospects for attaining support for their cause in the international community. Efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute were under way, and moderate Arab leaders did not want to see these undermined. Sensing this change in their backers' attitude, moderate Palestinians under the leadership of Yasir Arafat came to the conclusion that they must involve themselves in the negotiating process or risk being completely left out of a possible settlement.

The Palestinians' quest for international attention as well as their initial experiments in diplomacy culminated in Arafat's November 1974 appearance before the UN General Assembly. The PLO has subsequently been

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granted observer status in several UN specialized agencies as well as in the General Assembly.

With this new respectability has come a recognition of responsibility by the moderate leaders of the PLO and a greater sensitivity to the counterproductivity of terrorist attacks. The PLO now generally airs its political grievances through conventional channels such as international organizations and other diplomatic institutions. Indeed, the PLO not only minimizes its resort to international terrorism, but has also attempted to serve as a moderating influence on the more radical, violence-prone Rejectionist Front (Palestinian groups and Arab states which oppose any political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute).*

This shift in style and tactics on the part of the PLO has spawned a growing diplomatic corps. There has been a steady rise in the opening of "information" offices throughout the world (see Annex), and the Palestinians can now boast of having approximately 60 quasi-embassies. The PLO has also grown skilled in lobbying, as evidenced by the goodwill trips made by its senior officials in July in a successful concerted effort to obtain membership in the UN's Economic Commission for West Asia. The PLO has recently participated in international meetings on issues not directly related to the Middle Eastern situation in what can be seen as an attempt to appear as less of a one-issue group and more as a state.** Underlying this activity, however, is an attempt to bolster PLO prestige and leverage as a regional entity. Arafat has taken this new phase of Palestinian diplomacy into

**Those who wish to project a more moderate image for the PLO are faced with the dilemma of how to deal with PLO members who espouse Rejectionist Front ideas and tactics. While PLO moderates are at odds with these radicals, they have avoided any confrontation that would lead to an irreparable rupture. This has allowed the PLO to retain at least the facade of a common front for the Palestinian movement.*

***For example, the PLO has expressed interest in the work of UNIDO, IAEA, and the ILO, and has participated in the UN Conference on Desertification.*

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account in his bilateral dealings with states; thus he attempted to serve as a mediator in the Egypt-Libya border skirmish. He has also attempted to establish his moderate credentials with the major Western powers, as evidenced by the PLO's protection of American and British nationals in their evacuation from Beirut during the Lebanese civil war. In addition, PLO troops have cooperated with UN observers in the Lebanese crisis.

The current focus of the PLO's diplomatic efforts is to gain a clearly defined role for itself at a re-convened Geneva Middle East peace conference. As an adjunct to this, Arafat is advocating a direct dialogue with the United States. Attainment of these goals would be a significant advance in the organization's drive for greater official international recognition and would strengthen Arafat's position as leader of the Palestinian movement.

It is apparent from the PLO's current activity that it has learned the finer points of diplomatic tactics and is using age-old negotiating techniques. It appears to be establishing its initial position in a new round of bargaining, setting down its basic assumptions and the topics it wishes placed upon an agenda. While its style of expression has changed, the PLO's basic goals have not. The organization remains committed to the establishment of a Palestinian homeland governed by the PLO, as well as the fulfillment of other Palestinian "national rights."

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ANNEX: Palestine Liberation Organization Offices World-
wide

Note: The PLO has attached importance to the maintenance of a Palestinian presence in as many countries as possible. The growth of this presence has been impressive. The Arab Summit Conference following the June 1967 war decided to permit the PLO to assign representatives abroad. By mid-1974 the PLO had established a presence in 38 countries. There has been a notable increase in the number of its offices since the Arab Summit Conference of October 1974, when the PLO was recognized as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people.

The PLO offices usually have no formal status or accreditation in the host country, but some--particularly in Muslim countries--enjoy diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic status. In countries outside the Arab League the level of representation is generally low, with the representative working from the local Arab League office or from an "information office."

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ARAB LEAGUE STATES

Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania
Morocco
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen Arab Republic
People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen

AFRICAN STATES

Burundi
Chad
Congo (Brazzaville)
Guinea
Mali
Senegal
Tanzania
Uganda

AMERICAN STATES

Cuba
Mexico

ASIAN AND PACIFIC STATES

Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Japan
Laos
Malaysia
North Korea
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Vietnam

EAST EUROPEAN STATES

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Soviet Union
Yugoslavia

WEST EUROPEAN STATES

Belgium
Cyprus
France
Federal Republic of Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations
UNESCO
UNIDO

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The Proposed United Nations Hostage Convention:
Status and Prospects

A year has passed since the West German Government first proposed that the UN adopt a convention against the taking of hostages. Last month, the draft convention that the West Germans submitted in support of this initiative survived its first exposure to the procedural and substantive polemics of UN committee action. Despite the antagonism of radical Arab and African states--and the obstructive behavior of the Soviets--it appears to have won at least another year's lease on life. But West German professed optimism notwithstanding, the chances for the eventual adoption and effective implementation of a convention along the lines that Bonn has suggested remain slim at best. Since this judgment rests in part on an analysis of past trends and developments, the discussion that follows begins by casting West Germany's UN initiative into a broader historical and political perspective.

Background

General: International terrorism has recently emerged as a significant factor in world politics. However, with the exception of a number of bilateral agreements providing, among other things, for a greater exchange of intelligence and technical assistance and the prompt extradition of specified categories of terrorists, the international response to this problem has been relatively weak and ineffective. Over the past 14 years, a total of six international

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conventions have been concluded that have dealt with one or another aspect of international terrorism.* Although these accords reflect widespread concern and at least a slim majority consensus that something must be done, they presently do not--singly or in combination--constitute an effective constraint on terrorist activity. For one thing, a significant number of states, including a majority of the more radical, are not yet parties to the conventions. For another, all these conventions make the extradition or prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses, and none provides for the application of punitive sanctions against states that simply refuse to comply.

The obstacles which have thwarted more effective international action are formidable. One major stumbling block is the controversy over justifiable versus illegal political violence.** Another is broad resistance to the infringement of national sovereignty implied in any

**The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft) of September 1963; The Hague Convention (Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) of December 1970; The Montreal Convention (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation) of September 1971; The Organization of American States Convention (Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortions That Are of International Significance) of February 1971; the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents of December 1973; and the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of January 1977.*

***A substantial number of countries fear that effective international countermeasures against terrorism could be used to suppress or deny the legitimacy of "national liberation movements." Moreover, the more radical among them aver that any consideration of terrorism must begin with a condemnation of "state terrorism," a position which rests on the assumption that political violence is the natural product of "imperial, colonial, or racist practices.*

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inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum. A third is the natural reluctance of many states to commit themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution--either by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.

The Role of the UN: Not surprisingly, international terrorism has proved to be a particularly sensitive issue at the UN. The UNGA first addressed the problem in 1970 when it included the "duty" to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts against another state in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States that it adopted in October of that year. But even this essentially unenforcible admonition is weakened and clouded by the greater emphasis that the Declaration accords to the "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Indeed, the language employed in the latter regard implies that it is the overriding duty of all states to assist groups struggling for the realization of their right to self-determination, freedom, and independence in every way possible.

Similarly, in the wake of the 1972 Olympic Games tragedy the UNGA agreed to Secretary General Waldheim's request that it form a committee to consider measures to prevent international terrorism but explicitly expanded the group's mandate to include "the study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical change."*

**The committee, which met in New York from 16 July to 11 August 1973, was unable to reach agreement on either the causes of international terrorism or measures which might be taken to prevent such activity. In consequence, its report was simply a compendium of disparate and conflicting views. To date, neither the UNGA nor its Sixth Committee has been able (or willing) to find time to consider the report.*

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The tortured and fruitless efforts of that committee's 35 member states to define (and thereby, in effect, to outlaw) international terrorism underscored the difficulty of striving for comprehensive "solutions"--particularly in global forums. So too have US efforts, begun in 1972, to persuade the UNGA to adopt a "Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism." Indeed, with the exception of the recent European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism--a special case reflecting a consensus limited to members of the Council of Europe--the only successful international counterterrorism initiatives to date have involved accords covering specific types of terrorist acts. Within the UN, this approach has been reflected in the 1973 Protected Persons Convention and, most recently, in efforts to forge an international convention against the taking of hostages.

The Proposed UN Hostage Convention

Inspired in part by the raid on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna in December 1975 and the Entebbe hijacking six months later, West Germany proposed that the UN adopt a convention against the taking of hostages in September 1976. After considerable debate, the General Assembly constituted a 35-member ad hoc committee to consider "suggestions and proposals" from any state that might assist in the early preparation of a draft convention.*

Well-prepared, the West Germans took advantage of the committee's mandate by circulating a proposed draft convention among friendly delegations and by holding a series of informal meetings to discuss its various provisions. While Bonn hoped that such efforts would enhance the chances that its draft would receive formal,

**The Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages that was established by the General Assembly in December 1976 is separate and distinct from the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism that the General Assembly had established four years earlier. Although identical in number and regional composition, the memberships of the two committees differ in detail.*

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if not exclusive, consideration from the very outset of the committee's debate, it recognized that such consideration would be difficult to achieve in the short time allowed for the session.*

The Committee Debate: The committee debate quickly developed along familiar lines. At the outset of deliberations, OECD and most Latin American delegations asserted that the takings of hostages is in itself an inhumane act and that it should be internationally proscribed regardless of the motive or particular circumstances. Although a few of these delegations were willing to concede the right of "national liberation movements" to wage an armed struggle for self-determination, they were nonetheless unanimous in the opinion that no cause, however noble or righteous, could ever justify the taking of hostages.

In contrast, various Arab and African delegations, supported by the Soviet Union, argued that no draft convention could be applicable to national struggles for self-determination or freedom from oppression. They maintained that without agreement on this as a matter of principle, it would be pointless to discuss specific provisions of any proposal--including the West German draft convention. In keeping with this position, the Arab and African delegations advocated an unlimited period of general debate, a procedure which would have eliminated any possibility for substantive consideration of the West German draft convention.

Although efforts by Western delegations to limit general debate ultimately proved to be successful, their endeavors to secure adoption of the West German draft convention as the basis of committee debate did not. Hence, in order to assure the continued viability of the West German proposal, its supporters agreed among themselves to comment on other proposals only in reference to specific provisions of Bonn's draft convention. Their

**The Ad Hoc Committee met from 2 August to 19 August 1977. Further committee action will require reconvening of the committee by the 1977 General Assembly.*

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objective was to afford the West German draft de facto recognition and to ensure that its provisions received extensive consideration in the course of committee debate.

The Committee Report: As committee deliberations drew to a close, Western delegations began to concern themselves with the development of the committee's report to the General Assembly. They believed that it was important to the West German draft's chances for eventual adoption that the attention that it received during the debate be appropriately reported. The problem was that a Byelorussian delegate had earlier been elected *rappor-teur*, and, not surprisingly, the summary of debate that he produced reflected little of the committee's substantive consideration of the West German draft.* Hence the Western delegations initially pressed for acceptance of a committee secretariat report that more accurately summarized substantive debate.

In an effort to avoid conflict on preparation of the committee's final report, the West German delegation arranged a compromise whereby both the *rapporteur's* summary and the secretariat paper were set aside and a brief, one-paragraph report of committee action was adopted in their stead. This report stated only that progress was achieved in consideration "of draft articles submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany . . . as well as other proposals submitted by other delegations" and recommended that the work of the committee should be allowed to continue.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and other delegations believed that the West Germans could have achieved consensus on a more favorable report. The West Germans argued, however, that confrontation on this

**One of the more noteworthy aspects of the committee session was the singularly obstructionist conduct of the Soviet and East European delegations. At every opportunity these delegations did all in their power to create procedural controversy and delay the conduct of substantive debate. The rapporteur's biased reporting was the final incident in a well-orchestrated series of disruptive maneuvers.*

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issue might jeopardize the General Assembly resolution necessary to reconvene the committee. In part, Bonn's unwillingness to incur this risk probably stems from its sensitivity to domestic pressures generated by the dramatic growth of political terrorism within the borders of West Germany in recent years.

The Prognosis

It appears likely that this year's General Assembly will reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. Although little progress was achieved in this year's committee session, radical Arab and African delegations do not appear disposed to attempt a parliamentary wrecking operation. It can be assumed that many of these nations do not want to offend Western delegations unless it is necessary to achieve some vital national or regional interest. And although the issue of "national liberation movements" can be considered of vital interest to them, most will probably deem opposition to the committee's continued existence unnecessary, so long as it does not challenge this issue in concrete terms.

There is, however, less room for optimism with respect to the outcome of the Ad Hoc Committee's future deliberations. The problem of how to satisfy those who wish to exempt most or all of the hostages taken by "legitimate" national liberation movements is likely to prove particularly difficult to resolve. Indeed, the chances that the committee will be able to agree on any convention at all appear to be something less than even. Moreover, even in the somewhat unlikely event that the committee's efforts result in a convention that is fully consistent with Bonn's current draft, the predictable refusal of some key states to sign or ratify the document and the persistence of obstacles to the development of effective international countermeasures against terrorism would very probably serve to undermine its deterrent effect.

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